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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This is a permissive appeal from the district court's interlocutory Order 
Regarding Defendant's Competence to stand trial, filed December 6, 2010. On 
appeal, the state challenges the district court's ruling that it was prevented by 
"law of the case" from making a binding retrospective determination of Hawkins' 
competency to stand trial and represent himself in his 2008 trial for two counts of 
robbery. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Hawkins was tried and convicted of two counts of robbery in 2008. 
(#35281 R., Vol. I, p.197; Vol. II, pp.276-78. 1) See also State v. Hawkins, 148 
Idaho 774, 229 P.3d 379 (Ct. App. 2009) (review denied 4/29/1 0). He appealed 
and, on appeal, argued that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to sua 
sponte order a psychiatric evaluation and conduct a hearing to determine his 
competence to stand trial. Hawkins, 148 Idaho at 777, 229 P.3d at 382. 
Following an extensive recitation of the facts and a discussion of the legal 
principles governing the determination of when a district court must order a 
competency evaluation, the Idaho Court of Appeals agreed with Hawkins and 
vacated his conviction, holding: "[T]he district court should have entertained a 
reasonable doubt about Hawkins' mental competency either to stand trial or to 
1 By order of the Idaho Supreme Court, the appellate record in this case has 
been augmented with the clerk's record and transcripts in Hawkins' prior appeal, 
Supreme· Court Docket No. 35281. (See Order To Augment The Record, 
entered November 9, 2011.) 
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represent himself. Therefore, the district court's failure to sua sponte order a 
mental evaluation and make a determination as to Hawkins' competency was an 
abuse of discretion." ~ at 783, 229 P.3d at 388. The Court of Appeals 
concluded its analysis by stating: "Because it is not possible to retroactively 
make a determination as to Hawkins' competency at the time he was tried, we 
must vacate the judgment of conviction and leave the state free to retry Hawkins 
if he is found to be competent to stand trial." ~ (footnote omitted). The Court 
remanded the case to the district court "for further proceedings in accordance 
with [its] opinion." .!5;l 
On remand, the district court ordered Hawkins to undergo a competency 
evaluation pursuant to I.C. §§ 18-211 and 18-212. (R., pp.29-30, 34-36, 39.) 
Hawkins was evaluated by two different mental health professionals, licensed 
psychologist Dr. Chad Sombke and licensed psychiatrist Dr. Michael Estess. 
(11/12/1 0 Tr., p.9, L.14 - p.12, L.15, p.59, L.22 - p.60, L.18, p.67, L.18 - p.68, 
L.19; State's Exhibits 5 and 6.) At a hearing on the competency issue, both 
doctors opined, based on their interactions with Hawkins, his responses to 
testing, and other collateral information regarding Hawkins' social and 
institutional history, that Hawkins is competent to stand trial. (11/12/1 0 Tr., p.16, 
L.6 - p.46, L.5, p.53, L.2 - p.54, L.2, p.68, L.20 - p.95, L.3.) Specifically, Dr. 
Sombke testified that Hawkins is neither delusional nor psychotic; he is 
competent, understands the proceedings against him and is capable of assisting 
in his own defense. (11/12/10 Tr., p.28, L.16- p.46, L.5, p.53, L.2- p.56, L.13.) 
Dr. Estess likewise testified that Hawkins is "perfectly competent" to stand trial, 
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that "he is not psychotic and not delusional," and that there is "nothing about him 
... that would preclude his ability to confer with his attorney in his own defense or 
to understand the nature and circumstances of his legal difficulties." (11 /12/10 
Tr., p.91, L.24- p.95, L.3.) 
Dr. Estess further testified that he and his staff had numerous prior 
contacts with Hawkins during the two-year period he was housed in the Ada 
County Jail pending his trial in 2008. (11/12/10 Tr., p.62, L.8 - p.63, L.25.) 
Between 2006 and 2008, neither Dr. Estess, his staff, nor jail staff believed that 
Hawkins suffered from any mental illness. (11/12/10 Tr., p.64, L.14- p.67, 
L.17.) Dr. Estess characterized Hawkins as "arrogant[,} narcissi[stic], paranoid, 
inadequate, dependent, dishonest, antisocial ... angry, petulant, manipulative, 
deceitful, and dishonest, and coy." (11/12/10 Tr., p.65, Ls.16-22.) He opined, 
however, that at the time he was tried in January 2008, Hawkins "was perfectly 
competent to understand the nature of the proceedings, to confer with an 
attorney in his own defense and understand what was going on. . .. [B]asically, 
... hewascompetenttostandtrial." (11/12/10Tr., pp.99, L.18-p.100, L.19.) 
Based on the totality of the evidence presented to it, "including the 
admitted exhibits and testimony presented during the competency hearing," the 
district court found that Hawkins "is able to assist in his own defense and is 
capable of understanding [the] nature of the proceedings" and is therefore 
presently competent to stand trial. (R., p.135.) The court also found by clear 
and convincing evidence that Hawkins "understood the nature of the proceedings 
against him and was able to assist in his own defense at the time he went to trial 
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in this case in January 2008" and, thus, made the retroactive finding that 
Hawkins was competent during the 2008 trial. (R., pp.135-36.) Despite having 
made this latter determination, the district court concluded it was bound by what 
it deemed to be the "law of the case" and a controlling directive of the Idaho 
Court of Appeals to grant Hawkins a new trial. (R., p.136; see also R., pp.273-
74, ) Specifically, the court ruled: 
Although this Court has made the retroactive finding that the 
Defendant was competent to proceed to trial in January 2008, this 
Court is constrained by the law of the case and is bound to follow 
the remittitur of the Idaho Court of Appeals. Accordingly, this Court 
must retry this case and will set this case for a new trial. 
(R., p.136.) 
The state timely moved the district court for permission to file an 
interlocutory appeal from its December 6, 2010 Order Regarding Defendant's 
Competence, which granted Hawkins a new trial. (R., pp.243-52.) The district 
court entered an order granting the motion on February 1, 2011. (R., pp.272-76.) 
The state thereafter moved the Idaho Supreme Court for permission to appeal 
from the district court's December 6, 201 0 order. (Motion For Acceptance Of 
Appeal By Permission And Statement In Support Thereof, filed February 15, 
2011.) The Court granted the state's motion on April 27, 2011. (Order Granting 
Motion For Acceptance Of Appeal By Permission, entered April 27, 2011; see 
also R., p.373 (order attached to notice of appeal).) The state filed a timely 
notice of appeaL (R., pp.367-73.) 
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ISSUE 
In a single concluding sentence, unaccompanied by any analysis or 
citation to legal authority, the Court of Appeals in Hawkins' prior appeal stated: 
"Because it is not possible to retroactively make a determination as to Hawkins' 
competency at the time he was tried, we must vacate the judgment of conviction 
and leave the state free to retry Hawkins if he is found to be competent to stand 
trial." State v. Hawkins, 148 Idaho 774, 783, 229 P.3d 379, 388 (Ct. App. 2009) 
(footnote omitted). Did the district court erroneously conclude that this statement 
is "law of the case" that required it to order a new trial and prevented it from 
making a binding retroactive determination of Hawkins' competency to stand trial 
in the 2008 proceedings? 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erroneously Concluded It Was Prevented By "Law Of The 
Case" From Making A Binding Retroactive Competency Determination 
A. Introduction 
The district court found by clear and convincing evidence that Hawkins 
was mentally competent to stand trial in 2008. (R., pp.135-36.) Despite having 
made this finding, the court determined that a new trial is necessary based on 
the Court of Appeals' concluding statement in Hawkins' prior appeal that: 
"Because it is not possible to retroactively make a determination as to Hawkins' 
competency at the time he was tried, we must vacate the judgment of conviction 
and leave the state free to retry Hawkins if he is found to be competent to stand 
trial." State v. Hawkins, 148 Idaho 774, 783, 229 P.3d 379, 388 (Ct. App. 2009) 
(footnote omitted). The district court recognized that there is "clearly precedent 
for a retroactive psychological evaluation" (11/12/10 Tr., p.3, Ls.21-24; see also 
R., p.273 ("[T]here is case authority in other jurisdictions for this Court to make a 
retroactive competency decision.")), but concluded that the Court of Appeals' 
statement that such a retroactive determination "is not possible" and that 
Hawkins may be retried if he is presently competent constitutes the "law of the 
case," which it was constrained to follow (R., pp.136, 273-74). 
The district court erred in concluding it was prevented by "law of the case" 
from making a binding retroactive competency determination. Application of the 
law to the facts of this case shows that the Court of Appeals' statement that "it is 
not possible to retroactively make a determination as to Hawkins' competency at 
the time he was tried," is not "law of the case" because, in addition to being 
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unnecessary to the resolution of the only issue raised by Hawkins on appeal, the 
statement was rendered without analysis or citation to authority, and is contrary 
both to existing precedent and to the facts that have been developed on remand. 
Because the statement is not "law of the case," it does not prevent the district 
court either from making a binding retroactive determination of Hawkins' 
competency in the 2008 proceedings or from declining to order a retrial. 
B. The Statement At Issue Is Not "Law Of The Case" And Does Not Prevent 
The District Court Either From Making A Binding Retroactive 
Determination Of Hawkins' Competency To Stand Trial In The 2008 
Proceedings Or From Declining To Order A Retrial 
The Idaho Supreme Court has consistently articulated the "law of the 
case" doctrine as follows: 
The "law of the case" doctrine provides that when "the Supreme 
Court, in deciding a case presented states in its opinion a principle 
or rule of law necessary to the decision, such pronouncement 
becomes the law of the case, and must be adhered to throughout 
its subsequent progress, both in the trial court and upon 
subsequent appeal." 
Taylor v. Maile, 146 Idaho 705, 709, 201 P.3d 1282, 1286 (2009) (citations 
omitted); accord,~. Spur Products Corp. v. Stoel Rives LLP, 143 Idaho 812, 
816, 153 P.3d 1158,1162 (2007); Dachletv. State, 1361daho 752,759,40 P.3d 
110, 117 (2002); Stuart v. State, 136 Idaho 490, 495, 36 P.3d 1278, 1283 
(2001); Swanson v. Swanson, 134 Idaho 512, 515, 5 P.3d 973, 976 (2000). The 
doctrine also extends to cases decided by the Idaho Court of Appeals. 
Swanson, 134 Idaho at 516, 5 P.3d at 977. Although the doctrine "posits" that 
rules of law previously decided "should continue to govern the same issues in 
subsequent stages in the same case," the United States Supreme Court has 
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noted that "[l]aw of the case directs a court's discretion, it does not limit the 
tribunal's power." Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 618 (1983) (citations and 
footnote omitted), guoted in Stuart, 136 Idaho at 495, 36 P .3d at 1283. 
The district court concluded the Court of Appeals' statement in Hawkins' 
prior appeal that "it is not possible to retroactively make a determination as to 
Hawkins' competency at the time he was tried" was the "law of the case" that 
prevented the court from making a binding retroactive competency 
determination, despite having found by clear and convincing evidence that 
Hawkins was competent during his January 2008 trial. (R., pp.135-36, 273-74; 
see also 11/12/10 Tr., p.3, L.2 - p.4, L.21.) There are, however, at least two 
reasons why the district court erred. 
First and foremost, the statement at issue was not necessary to the Court 
of Appeals' resolution of the only issue(s) it identified on appeal- re., "whether 
in the course of Hawkins' self-representation, the district court should have 
considered sua sponte whether Hawkins was competent to undergo trial, and if 
so, whether Hawkins was rational enough to represent himself rather than be 
represented by counsel." State v. Hawkins, 148 Idaho 774, 779, 229 P.3d 379, 
384 (Ct. App. 2009). Whether Hawkins could or could not be retroactively 
deemed competent following a competency evaluation on remand had no 
bearing on the question actually before the Court of Appeals- whether the trial 
court should have entertained a bona fide doubt about Hawkins' competency 
such that it should have sua sponte ordered an evaluation at the time of trial. 
Because the question of whether it is possible to make a retroactive 
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determination of Hawkins' competency to stand trial in 2008 was neither 
necessary nor relevant to the Court of Appeals' determination that the trial court 
should have ordered a competency evaluation during the 2008 proceedings, it 
does not appear under established principles of law, ~. Taylor, 146 Idaho 
at 709,201 P.3d at 1286; Stuart, 136 Idaho at 495,36 P.3d at 1283, that the 
Court of Appeals' statement that a retroactive determination of Hawkins' 
competency "is not possible" is actually "law of the case." 
Second, although the Court of Appeals expressed its view, apparently 
based on the record before it, that it is not possible to retroactively determine 
Hawkins' competency when he was tried in 2008, there is no indication that the 
words chosen were actually intended by the Court to limit the trial court's power 
on remand to make its own findings regarding whether such a determination is 
possible. On this point, the reasoning of Stuart v. State, supra, is instructive. 
After Stuart was convicted of first degree murder, he petitioned for post-
conviction relief, alleging that the county sheriff had recorded confidential 
conversations he had with his attorney while he was in jail. Stuart, 136 Idaho at 
491-92, 36 P.3d at 1279-80. The district court summarily dismissed the petition, 
but the Idaho Supreme Court reversed, holding that Stuart had presented 
sufficient facts to warrant an evidentiary hearing on his claim. lsL. at 492, 36 P.3d 
at 1280. The Idaho Supreme Court remanded the case to the district court and 
stated, '"if such attorney-client conversations are found to have been recorded, 
the State will be required to show that the evidence at trial had an origin 
independent of the eavesdropping."' lsL. at 495, 36 P.3d at 1283 (emphasis 
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original) (citation omitted). Following an evidentiary hearing on remand, the 
district court found that the attorney-client conversations had been monitored, 
but held "that under the independent origin, inevitable discovery, and attenuated 
basis exceptions, the monitoring of telephone conversations did not lead to the 
discovery of witnesses" and, therefore, did not violate Stuart's constitutional 
rights. JJ;t at 492, 494, 36 P.3d at 1280, 1282. 
On appeal from the dismissal of his post-conviction petition following the 
evidentiary hearing on remand, Stuart argued that the Idaho Supreme Court's 
statement in his prior appeal that the state would "be required to show that the 
evidence at trial had an origin independent of the eavesdropping" was "law of the 
case" and, as such, the lower court was not at liberty to apply other exceptions to 
the exclusionary rule when rendering its decision. JJt at 495, 36 P.3d at 1283. 
The Idaho Supreme Court rejected Stuart's argument, noting that its prior 
opinion "provided little discussion as to why [the Court] chose to state that the 
State had to prove 'an origin independent of the eavesdropping."' JJt The Court 
noted that, as authority for its prior holding, it had cited a United States Supreme 
Court decision that discussed both the independent and attenuated basis 
exceptions to the exclusionary rule. JJ;t The Court then stated: "The holding in 
[Stuart's prior appeal] does not establish that the words used were chosen so as 
to preclude other exceptions." JJ;t Expounding upon this determination the Court 
reasoned: 
[T]his Court has not previously been presented the 
opportunity to examine the [exceptions relied upon by the district 
court] and determine their applicability in Idaho. The United States 
Supreme Court has articulated the three exceptions - independent 
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ongrn, inevitable discovery, and attenuated basis - in a line of 
cases dating back to 1939. With no case law from this Court on 
the subject, it cannot be presumed that this Court has decided that 
the inevitable discovery and attenuated basis exceptions should 
not be applied in Idaho. 
ld. Having concluded that the language it used in Stuart's prior appeal was not 
intended to limit the trial court's discretion, the Stuart Court held that the "law of 
the case doctrine [did} not preclude the application of all three exceptions to the 
exclusionary rule in [that} case." !sL 
The reasoning of Stuart is applicable to this case. As in Stuart, the Court 
of Appeals in Hawkins' prior appeal "provided little discussion as to why it chose 
to state" that "it is not possible to retroactively make a determination as to 
Hawkins' competency at the time he was tried." In fact, the statement appears in 
a single concluding sentence of the Court of Appeals' opinion, unaccompanied 
by any analysis or citation to authority. See Hawkins, 148 Idaho at 783, 229 
P.3d at 388. In light of the fact that the Court of Appeals did not cite or discuss 
any cases standing for the proposition that retroactive competency 
determinations are not possible, it does not appear that the Court intended by its 
statement to limit the trial court's discretion to make a binding retroactive 
competency determination on remand. This is especially true since the weight of 
authority actually supports the conclusion that such determinations are possible. 
As noted by the district court in its order granting the state's motion for 
permissive appeal, the question of whether retroactive competency 
determinations are possible is an issue of first impression in Idaho. (R., p.274.) 
However, numerous other jurisdictions have considered the issue and have 
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determined that such determinations "are permissible whenever a court can 
conduct a meaningful hearing to evaluate retrospectively the competency of the 
defendant." Moran v. Godinez, 57 F.3d 690, 696 (9th Cir. 1995) (citations 
omitted), superseded Q.y statute on other grounds as stated in Van Tran v. 
Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir. 2000); see also United States v. Duncan, 643 
F.3d 1242, 1250 n.3 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Odie v. Woodford, 238 F.3d 1084, 
1089 (9th Cir. 2001) (trial court's failure to hold a competency hearing at the time 
of trial can be cured by holding a retrospective competency hearing "when the 
record contains sufficient information upon which to base a reasonable 
psychiatric judgment")); United States v. Auen, 846 F.2d 872, 878 (2d Cir. 1988) 
("[T]he district court is in the best position to determine whether it can make a 
retrospective determination of competency."); United States v. Renfroe, 825 F.2d 
763, 767-68 (3rd Cir. 1987) (same); United States v. Mason, 52 F.3d 1286 (4th 
Cir. 1995) (same); Wheat v. Thigpen, 793 F.2d 621 (5th Cir. 1986) (upholding 
retroactive competency determination where the evidence allowed for a 
meaningful retrospective hearing and established defendant's competence at the 
time of trial); Galowski v. Berge, 78 F .3d 1176, 1180-82 (ih Cir. 1996) (same); 
Reynolds v. Norris, 86 F.3d 796, 802 (8th Cir. 1996) (meaningful retroactive 
competency determination possible where "the state of the record, together with 
such additional evidence as may be relevant and available, permits an accurate 
assessment of the defendant's condition at the time"); Clayton v. Gibson, 199 
F.3d 1162, 1168-72 (10th Cir. 1999) (same); Watts v. Singletary, 87 F.3d 1282, 
1286-87 n.6 (11th Cir. 1996) ("nunc pro tunc competency hearing [possible], so 
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long as a reliable inquiry into the defendant's competency can still be made"); 
accord Thompson v. Commonwealth, 56 S.W.3d 406, 409 (Ky. 2001); State v. 
Johnson, 395 N.W.2d 176, 184-85 (Wis. 1986); State v. Sanders, 549 S.E.2d 
40, 53-55 (W.Va. 2001 ); Commonwealth v. Santiago, 855 A.2d 682, 694 (Pa. 
2004); Tate v. State, 896 P.2d 1182, 1186 (Ok. 1995); Montana v. Bostwick, 988 
P.2d 765, 772-73 (Mont. 1999). 
Idaho's appellate courts have never before passed on the question of 
whether retroactive competency determinations are possible. The weight of 
authority from other jurisdictions indicates such determinations are possible in 
appropriate circumstances. In light of this fact, and "[w]ith no case law from 
[either the Idaho Supreme Court or Court of Appeals} on the subject, it cannot be 
presumed" that the Court of Appeals' single, concluding and unsupported 
statement in Hawkins' prior appeal -i.e., that "it is not possible to retroactively 
make a determination as to Hawkins' competency at the time he was tried" -
actually decided the legal question of whether such determinations are 
permissible in Idaho. Stuart, 136 Idaho at 495, 36 P.3d at 1283. 
In addition to being unsupported by any legal authority, the Court of 
Appeals' conclusory statement that "it is not possible to retroactively make a 
determination as to Hawkins' competency at the time he was tried" is also 
contrary to the facts that have been developed on remand. When the Court of 
Appeals decided Hawkins' prior appeal the only evidence it had before it was 
that contained in the appellate record and transcripts of the pretrial, trial and 
sentencing proceedings. While it may not have been possible, based on this 
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limited evidence, for the Court of Appeals to discern whether Hawkins was 
competent at the time he was tried, there is now substantial evidence in the 
record that shows such a determination is, in fact, possible. 
Since the Court of Appeals' decision, Hawkins has been evaluated by two 
mental health experts, both of whom opined that Hawkins is presently competent 
to be tried. (11/12/1 0 Tr., p.16, L.6- p.46, L.5, p.53, L.2- p.54, L.2, p.68, L.20-
p.95, L.3.) One of the experts, Dr. Estess, also testified that he and his staff had 
frequent contact with Hawkins while he was confined in the Ada County Jail 
pending his January 2008 trial. (11/12/10 Tr., p.62, L.8- p.63, L25.) Based on 
those interactions and his comprehensive review of other information bearing on 
Hawkins' competency (including the trial transcripts and information pertaining to 
Hawkins' prior social, institutional, and mental health history) Dr. Estess opined 
"to a reasonable degree of medical certainty" that Hawkins was "perfectly 
competent" when he stood trial in January 2008. (11/12/10 Tr., p.64, L.14-
p.67, L.17, p.97, L.6 - p.100, L.13.) Thus, the record now is substantially 
different than the record presented in relation to Hawkins' prior appeal, including 
the fact that the district court has now found by clear and convincing evidence 
that Hawkins was competent at the time he was tried in 2008. While the Court of 
Appeals may have intended its statement that ''it is not possible to retroactively 
make a determination as to Hawkins' competency at the time he was tried" to 
guide the district court's discretion, nothing about the statement suggests that 
the Court intended to preclude the district court from making a different finding in 
light of additional facts developed in the competency hearing that followed. In 
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other words, there is nothing about the Court of Appeals' statement that 
suggests it is actually "law of the case" to which the trial court must adhere. 
The district court has found by clear and convincing evidence that 
Hawkins was competent when he was tried in January 2008. (R., pp.135-36.) If, 
as the state contends, the Court of Appeals' statement that "it is not possible" to 
retroactively determine Hawkins' competency is not "law of the case," the trial 
court's finding would obviate any need for a retrial. Requiring such a retrial, 
when there is authority and evidence that supports the trial court's retroactive 
competency determination, would be an extreme waste of time and resources. 
This is especially true given the trial court's concern that, if retried, Hawkins will 
engage in the same obstructionist behavior he exhibited during his first trial that 
ultimately led Court of Appeals to conclude there existed a bona fide doubt about 
his competency: 
The defendant continues in his pro se status after an 
extensive Faretta inquiry and there is a very high likelihood his 
competency will continue to come into question at a new trial and 
would require the Court to have a psychiatrist present during the 
trial, in the event that the defendant were to act out in some 
manner that on an appellate record would appear to be a loss of 
competence. Assuming that the appellate courts of Idaho were to 
allow a retroactive competency determination to be dispositive in 
this case as well as potentially other cases, the State would need 
not to retry the defendant if the court so rules. 
(R., pp.274-75.2) Because it appears under established principles of law that the 
Court of Appeals' concluding statement in Hawkins' prior appeal is not "law of the 
2 Notably, since the district court ruled on the issue of his competency, Hawkins 
has filed numerous motions in the district court, including two motions for a new 
or reopened competency hearing. (See R., pp.258-63, 292, 295, 345.) 
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case," the district court's order finding that it was prevented by "law of the case" 
from making a retroactive competency determination should be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court reverse that portion of the 
district court's December 6, 2010 Order Regarding Defendant's Competence in 
which the district court found it was prevented by "law of the case" from making a 
binding retrospective determination of Hawkins' competence to stand trial, and 
remand the case for further proceedings. 
DATED this 29th day of December 2011. 
?oh~ Ffli~SfS 
Deputy Attorney General 
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